Mining Secrets

                   HOBBYISTS INFOWAR IS ALIVE

How can a hobbyist win an INFOWAR?  An example might be the targeting of autos on the
highway using RF Electronic interception and intrusion.  What would be the outcome of RF
Electronic Intrusion?

It could shutdown the car's electronic systems causing other systems on board to do
similarly in successive order. How can this come about?  Well the answer is quite clear,
the high powered signal causes control  centers to be disrupted and forces the control
chips to ignore basic operational commands from the microprocessor. This compels the
microprocessor to cause a halt to basic actions so that the car stops running. 
 
Known incidents have had both amusing and fatal results as reported by defense oriented
press. Examples are:  
 
1. As early as the mid-seventies, Volkswagen developed a computer controlled fuel
injection valve control system. The car worked perfectly in Europe, but experienced
unexplained engine failures in the United States. The problem was intermittent and very
short lived when it occurred.  The cause of these failures was transmission on Citizens
Band radio frequencies from either mobile or base stations that induced sufficient energy
to cause a chip malfunction. 

2. They reported that some GM cars were having problems with their electronic control
systems near hobbyists using two meter radios. They report that other cars had
performance problems with cellular signals.

3. Reports from BBS in England say  problems occur in a wide spectrum of autos in the
area around Coventry.  The situation is caused by RF leaked from the transmitter signal
side lobes created by Radio Four, a commercial station transmitting on 1500 meters along
with local AM and FM broadcasts.  The station transmitter was using a very high wattage.
When transmitting, cars that passed close to the station would sometimes experience
electronics shutdown resulting in operational problems and angry/confused motorists.

If you look at these experiences, you may see possible small scale urban electronic
warfare possibilities. Two such areas might include the use of directed radio energy against
late model autos by law enforcement or worse, by terrorist factions seeking to disrupt the
internodal transportation grid. 

4. Another example concerns the sudden acceleration problems with some imported cars
in the U.S. An interesting point to mention is that HONDA is offering owners of the 1988
Civic a  replacement chip because of signal caused problems.   

5. On the lighter side of the problem, it was reported in the November 24th, 1987 edition
of the Baltimore Sun, that some residents of Frederick, MD were having problems with their
electronic garage door openers. Owners of such devices returned them to places of
purchase but found that the units worked perfectly. They noted that nearby, the U.S. Army
operates a major communications center for both domestic and international traffic. An
Army spokesperson stated that they are not radiating signal that would affect the garage
door receivers. They also report that when the Army turned off certain transmitters, the
garage door openers would work again. While the Army stated that they were not the
problem, the "problem" did disappear when the Army stopped transmitting.
 
6. Some incidents are more deadly than funny.  The cause of fatal incidents was all not
due to an "Alligator" radio, but was caused by an over powered, radiated radio emission.
The cause again was high power output.  It was to effect a new type of attack helicopter
in use by two U.S. armed services.   The helicopter, known as the AH-64, Blackhawk or
the naval version named Seahawk is considered, operational state of the art for low
intensity air combat situations.  Both versions are highly electronic in basic design.

The problem was twofold in nature.  We related both in the final discovery of cause.
 
The first cause is a design employing a unique horizontal stabilizer to enhance the
helicopter's operational performance.  They control the stabilizer through a series of
electronically activated hydraulic systems controlled using some microprocessors that in
turn were managed from the cockpit through a series of other logical and electronic relay
systems. There was no physical connection between the craft's flight controls and the pilot
of the craft. A set of wireless relays and hydraulic attenuators replaced the fly by wire
cables and pulleys. Old-fashioned mechanical operation may not have been as responsive
as electronic control of flight, but it took an explosive charge to bring the aircraft to a dead
stick condition.  

The second problem, unconsidered and deadly, consisted of radio frequency interference
stemming from several different sources.  One such source was found  in some common
citizens band radio with illegal power output.   An incident  occurred when the helicopters
flew to close to a commercial radio station's transmissions towers. Each time the flight
ended with fatalities. They discovered that RF signal in the CB range was the cause.
According to published reports, 5 UH-60 Blackhawks have nose dived into the ground
killing 22 military personnel.   The  U.S. Army instructed its pilots that flights near
microwave antennas or shipboard radar may cause "uncommanded" altitude changes. In
English, it translates to crashing into the ground at 600 miles per hour.

The problem was controls of the craft being directed by signals instead of physical
connections.  Contributing to aircraft controls failure is commercial RF from both
background and directed uses of radio frequency energy as weapons of warfare used by
partisans in limited urban actions. 

They did not think of this problem as possible even with the current concerns of systems
management in the now fully electronically manipulated battlefield.  Hackers helpers
working for the U.S.Navy at Warminster, PA supplied most of this and the following. 

If we assume a normal radio environment and consider possible options available to an
indirect force, we have the basis for Hacker Electronic Warfare.  Reports of this nature are
known to the public.  What is to stop Hacker RF from becoming a new invisible tactic that
can cause major disruptions of computer / communications systems currently in use.  SDI
and the USAF Weapons Laboratory have "black" high powered "burn them up" microwave
weapons under development.  Get a copy of "An Evaluation of Potential Countermeasures
to the Strategic Defense Initiative" under FOIA from the Naval Postgraduate School at
Monterey CA to use as a tutorial for defining "kill" potential. 
 
The current state of electronic weapon technologies used by defense agencies is available
on the INTERNET.  First, we can study the problem of large Electro-Magnetic Pulses,
(EMP's) being able to disrupt command and communications links with the use of one
nuclear device detonated above the continental united states.

A second example comes from theoretical research concerning the SDI programs.  A
thought, from Theodore B. Taylor, a retired nuclear weapons' designer and father of the
largest yield fission bomb, the S.O.B., was quoted in an interview published in September
1987.  Mr. Taylor stated that if you explode a one-kiloton device in space and directed the
energy into a 3-centimeter beam of radiation, you could deposit enough energy to wipe out
electronic and electrical equipment - computers, antennas, power lines, over an area larger
that Washington, D.C. They also quoted him as saying that microwave weapons are more
than likely being developed by both friendly and unfriendly governments. 
 
Weapons of this nature are on a very large and require vast amounts of energy with which
to start.  Yet a directed small beam aimed at residential/commercial constructed buildings,
a directed beam of energy cuts through walls, doors, and windows as if they were not even
there.  An example is the local television or radio stations in your area.  If you were to look
at all of the stations, you might find a small shack atop or on the side of the building. It
contains the microwave dishes for studio to transmitter links. The glass and wood are
nothing to the incoming or out going signals. Brick walls mean nothing to a radio signal
either. Just tune in your desk radio and listen to your favorite station. 
 
A properly configured pulse can short most commercial electrical, telecommunications,
computer operations, or any other devices that contain transistors or semiconductors in its
circuit path. These basic examples show what such types damage that these emissions
may pose. 
 
The second problem of the Fly by Signal Helicopter deals with protection of circuitry.
Protection from random RF comes as deep trenches, standard and special grounding of
buildings and equipment, cables and support runways, and concrete encasements.  All this
is wonderful and good from a military viewpoint where money is no object.  In the real
world, the use of such protective measures is not possible even for the most prestigious
corporations. 
 
Large pulses can destroy equipment on a global scale. The idea of using pulses as a tool
for the destruction of security and measures taken to secure electronics evolved as
Sobczak studied the potential for an individual with multifaceted skills beyond those of a
traditional hacker.  You now know a little about how directed energy can be used to disrupt
communications and the operations of logical unprotected chip devices. There are many
ways to use  technology to gather and alter electronic impulses.

Another group of examples comes closer to Joe Citizen and his interests.  It is happening
all to frequently to the owner / operators of mass communications systems. Best known is
the interruption of signals from a Home Box Office satellite and the insertion of a message
that stated  its subscription rate was to high.  That one incident struck fear in the hearts of
the communications industry and showed that anything transmitted by RF signal was fair
game.

Other attacks include the interception and signal override of two television stations in the
Chicago area. One action was against a Public Broadcasting station and the other was
directed to one of the "Super Stations" in the same area. The first pirate transmission
lasted 15 seconds and the second, two hours later, lasted 90  seconds. The Pirate,
dressed in a Max Headroom face mask, uttered some statement, although garbled in his
first attempt. During the second incident, he bent over and exposed his rear.  He was
struck on the behind by his girl friend using a fly swatter.  The FBI and FCC investigated,
but investigation led to an empty trail. 

To try to create an attack, one would have to buy the SAM's book of frequencies,  ask their
members of Congress for the latest frequency charts (they give them as a constituent
service) or call the local office of the FCC to find out what the area transmitter and studio
to transmitter frequencies are.  All frequencies are publicly available for any transmitter
registered with the FCC. The FCC will supply the name and location, frequency, and the
maximum legal output of such sites.  There are two frequencies used for each television
channel. One is for the Audio and the other is for the Video.  Listen or watch the station
until it signs' off for the day (night). They give the frequencies at sign-on and sign-off. A
good example of such frequencies is with a station in Philadelphia, Pa. The station, WPVI,
transmits its audio signal on commercial FM frequencies.  The frequency is 87.8 MHZ.
Anyone with a transmitter of sufficient power could add audio and no one would be the
wiser until the deed was done. 
 
Other stories of interest deal with the possible and real way some can jam or possibly
damage state of the art satellite communications. The first deals with the American
Technocratic Association based loosely in Wilmington, Delaware.  This group protests
scrambling in use by the pay TV companies.

The background of the members of this group  is based on a good working knowledge of
military radar communications systems.  Most are GS grade employees at a New Jersey
defense contractor installation.  The group claims to be able to jam a satellite with the few
mobile systems it has built.  They call one operation that the group has begun "Operation
Sunspot." The group claims to have mapped areas that have no treaty, regulation or
statute dealing with the jamming of a geostationary satellite.  Satellite operators' Know this
could easily happen.   Military planners say that such things could not happen, but if one
looks in any number of hobbyist on-line magazines for such information on frequencies or
locations, it is readily available. 
 
So you say to yourself, "I want to construct a RF weapon." Well, I am not about to supply
exact detailed technique, but will say that HAM radio operators can contact both American
and Soviet repeater satellites.  If you wanted to capture a satellite channel, you could.  I
did.  For your uplink you need a transmitter dish and the power behind the signal.  A ten-
foot dish needs approximately 91 watts; a six foot dish needs 280 watts. Generating high
powered signals in the mid range of 1-10 Ghz is not cheap, but the task does not present
a technical obstacle to even a novice.  They sell surplus military electronics equipment in
every metropolitan area.
 
You do not need a big dish to do this.  All that we need is a moderate size dish and a few
tens of watts at microwave frequencies to own an effective satellite jamming station!   Next
you have to address the issue of the telemetry channel.  Your signal probably cannot
override the true signal, but jamming the signal with another, will affect the operation,
stability or orbit of the target. Frequencies for such channels are available from several
sources and for as little as $2.00 per frequency.  
 
Reported stories dealing with television stations interruption's are fast becoming a feared
aspect of open air transmissions.  Transmissions at any frequency are just a phone call
away.  Suppliers provide common or business radio transmission technology on demand.

If RF can interrupt satellite and television stations, they take down six million dollar
helicopters because of CB radios, and automobiles cease to operate due to a wide
spectrum of emitted signals, then the possibility to intercept and harvest vast amounts of
knowledge is available to those who wish to gather such.  The business of selling
technology in third world nations is yet to be explored.
 
Explanations of basic interceptions are commonplace.  For a simplistic view of emitted
signals, take a standard  "Walkman" type of radio and visit one of the many locations of
ATM's. (This exercise may also be done  near any standard personal computer if you have
an aversion to ATM machines.)   Tune through the FM band. With careful tuning, you will
be able to "hear" a machine electronic signature as transactions are occurring.  Using a
portable recorder, one can copy and later reconstruct impulses to a readable form, if you
use the proper tools.  Similarly, tune a mechanical television receiver slightly off  Channel
6 to read a VDT up to a mile away.  Using Radio Shack commercial equipment I have
collected signals from one and one half miles away.

A larger and better known signal collector is the backyard home satellite dish. Dishes range
from 6 to 12 feet wide.  Available signals include music, sports, news, movies, stock and
commodity trading quotes, weather, education and similar information services. In addition,
many different multi-site conference services are available from a host of major hotel
chains and privately organized meetings held for specific times and dates.  We may tune
by using a dish.  They make sensitive information that may not normally be available,
available and no one is the wiser.  Step vans sit across from the UN, McGuire AFB,
Washington Navy Yard and collect signal daily.  Transponders are not private.  They rent
them on a time used basis.  Satellites transmit the signals over a wide area to anyone who
can receive such signals. 
 
An available item of hobbyist equipment is the small Micro-Sat by Norsat. This system
offers both satellite bands' coverage, Ku and C, via a small dish and circuit board that fit
inside an IBM PC. The unit down blocks in the range 950 MHz to 1.45 Ghz.  It offers a
maximum baud rate of 115,600 bps, frequency, bandwidth, video and audio selectable
formats and may be connected to the VideoCipher II, B-Mac and Oak Orion descrambling
systems. 
 
Other signal reconstruction devices are available through the mails. A plan is available
from Don Britton Enterprises.  They call it the Re-Process Sync Amplifier.  They developed
the device to capture signals leaked from cable television systems. The device takes signal
that "leaks" from cable TV systems and adds the sync signal needed by your television set
to display the received signals.  It then sends the signal to the antenna input of your set so
that display may happen. If weak signal reception is available from leaking cable systems,
then the ability to receive weak signals from logical devices is also possible. 

Interception and Weapons Possibilities

Possible RF signal interception points become limitless. They may encrypt transmitted
communications.  Data collected may be stored on magnetic media for later decryption.
Access to encrypted data is only a matter of time. The next security interest covered is
encryption of the information in its stored and transmitted form. The encryption is all
wonderful and good for the transmission and storage, but does nothing for its final stage.
Several special interest groups provide software and/or decryption help.
 
Some say that interception is not possible since they encrypt the information.  However
they must decrypt data so that the human connection may use the information. The human
connection allows for the reception of information by the previously mentioned RF data
collection devices.  Patience allows interception to happen through the clear RF of the
devices being monitored.  Other possible points of reception / transmission security
breaches range from building energy management to security access and closed circuit
TV monitoring controls.
 
To give a better understanding of other collection equipment, we identify another device
known in the hacker community.  One device known is the Van Eck.  The other is the
Re-Process Sync Amplifier.  There are no major differences between the two, except the
Van Eck device is built for operation on European voltages and has a built-in digital
frequency meter. The one major difference found is with the dates of copyrights for the two
devices. They date the Don Britton device 1979, while they date the Van Eck unit October
1985.   
 
Note: Plans are available from Consumertronics, in Alamorgordo, New Mexico. Besides
the plans for a Van Eck type reader, the book offers information referencing computer
crime and security countermeasures.  It explains in some detail  how they penetrate
systems.  The book identifies sources of BBS advice, Password defeats, TEMPEST,
crosstalk amplifiers and has a 200 word phreaking term glossary. All for only $15.00.
 
We will begin with the Van Eck box.  They design it for use with European TV's and VDT's
as compared with the American Britton box.  These devices are designed to restore and
regenerate the sync and color burst signals.  They ignore any information appearing during
either the vertical or horizontal blanking.  Their basic result is to reconfigure signals by
supplying artificial external signals entered directly to any video monitor through a simple
modification of the TV or video monitor.  In simple English, they take a weak video signal
and shape or match it while boosting output to that required by a normal television screen.
 
There are several devices that help in the restoring and restructure of the picture and
sound. We know one device as the "Line Zapper." The device adjusts brightness changes,
vertical  jumping, ittering, and video noise. It is available in kit or complete form. Pricing
starts at $69.95 and complete tested units cost $124.95.  This unit helps by filtering and
structuring commercially induced weak signals.  It boosts signal presented to it and cleans
the picture to a form acceptable to most television sets or VDTs. Some may see this device
incorporated into the Van Eck type of gear should help in the overall signal restructuring
as a filter for video processing with a focal point on the actual copy-guard techniques. 
 
They addressed video signaling reconstruction methods in a multi-part series published in
Radio-Electronics based on the methodology used for the construction of video signals
scrambled by different vendors of cable and over the air pay television. The series dealt
with all aspects and methods of video and audio used in commercial systems (complete
with discussions on the DES methods used for the VideoCipher units and the like) in use.

Since the screen of a computer is for the most part stable in display, you can take an
intercepted signal and digitize it.   This process would filter out signal noise to clean up any
true video signal present.  This is no great techno-wonder.  We could compose the basic
gear of Radio Shack or the like types of equipment. The cost is still most reasonable. If not
available off-the-shelf, costs for gear constructed at home would not be excessive. Simple
electronics building blocks would consist of comparators, video detectors, data separator
gates, a to d / d to a converters, data amplifiers and a signal level converter. 
 
A better version, might be a modified slow scan television system  with error correction and
clean up circuits. Such units work over normal phone lines or standard radio channels.
The units can accept signals from these two different inputs.  There should be no problem
in adapting the unit to accept a cleaned up analog signal from a digitizer. 
 
There are two types of monitors prevalent today. We call the first composite.  The second
uses TTL logic to control the screen and its pattern. The composite screen is nothing more
than a television set or  Apple computer monitor. A beam of electrons does the
construction of the picture scanned across the screen at a rate of 525 lines per second.
Since most of the screens are of a composite nature ( this is even true in most IBM and
clone environments) the ability to receive signals is practical from a radio emission. 
 
Reception of such signals is not fairytale.  Use of simple electronics attains reality. The first
part of the reception project is a method of signal acquisition and amplification. The use
of standard electronics store technology may perform such gathering. For this example,
I will use common Radio Shack electronics.  A common variety of electronics is available
to persons needing to accomplish the required gathering.   
To start, a base station is out of the question due to the weak signals one would have to
receive. The need for transportable equipment is important.  Antenna, amplifier, sync
process unit and display medium must be powered in the transit unit. Depending on budget
and Basic Equipment List requirements, a fully battery operated set up can be constructed
for less than $1,500.
        
The two systems described here will be different only in  construction and budgetary BEL's.
 
The "Radio Shack" Reader 

1. The antenna could consist of a Radio Shack TV/FM # 15-1611
 
2. If needed, Radio Shack in-line signal amplifier 10 DB gain # 15-1117
 
3. Radio Shack RF Video Modulator # 15-1273
 
4. The Britton or Van Eck unit (Costs about $200 do it yourself to about $1000 for a
professionally constructed unit)
 
5. The tuning section may consist different available FM, TV, UHF tuners available for the
tuning of TV Sound & Picture reception and possible recording. Costs for such units range
from  119.95 to approximately 319.95.   The 319.95 unit can operate on AC / DC, has
audio / video input jacks and can operate on 9 "D" batteries. Lower cost units would be
either Radio Shack 16-109 or 16-111. The units cost 219.95 and 159.95 respectively.  Both
can tune in the full commercial AM / FM and VHF/UHF television signals, The low end of
the cost spectrum would be the Radio Shack # 16-113 at 119.95 This unit also has
spectrum tuning abilities. 

The Gold Plated Unit
 
1. The antenna could consist of a Radio Shack TV/FM # 15-1611  (Or this might be omitted
due to the use of better reception electronics having built in antennas.  Due to the need for
amplified signals we will still might use Radio Shack amplified antennas.)

   a. Using any number of amateur radio antennas is possible.  To maintain a low profile,
use one of the standard active receiving antennas that has a spectrum of reception from
50 MHz to 1 Ghz. Such units are available from mail order supply houses.
 
2. If still needed, Radio Shack in-line signal amplifier 10 DB gain # 15-1117. You might also
use # 15-1105 Indoor FM Signal Booster with switchable 0, 10 or 20 DB gain.
 
3. Radio Shack RF Video Modulator # 15-1273. 
 
4. The Britton or Van Eck unit (Cost about $200 do-it-yourself and up to $1000 for a
professionally constructed unit)
 
5. Tuning units,  The tuning unit consists of two separate radio units. The units, both
ICOM's have a combined tuning range of 100 KHZ to 2 Ghz. 

     a. Unit 1 (R-71a) tunes from 100 KHz to 30 MHz. This unit is a shortwave receiver
with excellent signal reception and frequency stability that offers far better overall signal
interception quality. The unit offers 1 Hz tuning and has digital frequency readout.  As an
option, an IBM or compatible PC may control this unit.

     b. Unit 2 (R7000) covers 30 MHz to 2 Ghz. This unit is a general coverage receiver
with excellent signal reception and frequency stability that offers far better overall signal
tuning and interception quality.  This unit can be computer controlled through an IBM or
compatible PC. The unit offers .01 Hz tuning and has digital frequency readout. Additional
abilities include signal output and IF output of 10.7 MHz with other frequencies available.
This unit also has an option for the output of video signal and connection of any standard
video monitor. The unit can be upgraded with an ability to receive signals from 20 KHz and
go all the way to the specified 2 Ghz. The unit needed is called a Kuranishi FC-7000
frequency converter. With additional commercial television MDS tuning equipment, ranges
can exceed 2.7 Ghz.  Since we are dealing in the lower ranges of frequencies, a  Radio
Direction Finder available from American Electronics may be used to identify the best
signal reception.
 
Another minimum cost system is the common Black & White Television set available in
mass quantities from any number of sources. They have reported that good interception
capabilities are possible and have occurred without the intercepted knowing until the
Communications Commission has contacted the source of the emitted signals. 
 
We have known screens of personal computers to been picked up on the black and while,
manual tuner TV screens of their neighbors with nothing more than rough or fine tuning the
reception. The reason is due to some TV's having the ability to automatically adjust the
Sync signals to a level close to the frequency of intercepted computer screens sync
frequency.   This "ability" is available by using a common  manual type tuner on a standard
Black & White set with a normal directional antenna and a standard antenna amplifier. All
three devices in a common interface attached to a television receiver make you dangerous.
 
You have intercept potential if you have an antenna on your roof or attached to your set.
Most have inherent signal amplification due to the ever growing background noise
generated by normal commercial stations and normal reception characteristics.  In simple
terms, the guy next door can read your screen and you do not know it. Realizing the
number of personal computers in a corporate environment, you can estimate the dollar
value of the combined information contained in these machines.  Substantial increases in
value are more evident if they store business plans, formulas or patent-trade information,
client lists, or any other type of valuable information.  Since that information will be called
up anytime or when necessary work performed the surveillance gathering operation is a
wide open, legal way of monitoring daily business practices and transactions with complete
impunity from areas completely unguarded due to the lack of knowledge.  In an experiment
I copied word processing screens from the UN while standing across the East River. 
 
We have viewed a wide spectrum of emitted signals with a strong signal between 9.0 and
9.250 MHz for the display of standard text scrolling. Better signal display was found at the
lower frequencies of 9 MHZ.  VDT frequencies were found around 11 through 19.5 - 20
MHZ.  Printer frequencies are between 140 and 200-mhz.  We detected disk operations
in the ranges of 88 to 250-mhz.  Overall frequency generation was from 4 through 500-
mhz.  The modem is found between 28 and 300-mhz.  Overall, this discovery of radiated
or transmitted signals by means of common radio technology could lead to major
insecurity. 
 
An interesting thought arises about the use of some common ham transceivers for
collection operations.  With simple modifications, they can transmit on all frequencies from
1.6 to 30 MHz. Such a transmitter would be the XXXXXXXXXXX (available to Sobczak's
clients).  This transceiver offers 100 watt output and as stated in the sales literature all
frequencies transmit. To perform the small modification, all one would have to do is cut one
lead to a diode (Diode D 80).  As an added  bonus for better frequency readout, you gain
an additional readout of 10 Hz by snipping the lead to Diode 66.  Now, this unit covers the
range of IBM PC frequencies in use and all of Apple systems as well.  Reversed the unit
offers the possibility for disruption of internal signals used to process information and the
possibility of causing other logic related systems to act or not without reason. 
 
It would be possible for a terrorist to sit under cover with a modified Kenwood 440 100 watt
radio or better yet, a Radio Shack 40 channel AM / SSB and a 100 watt Firebird linear
amplifier using a simple small antenna to disperse the signal.  The operational
characteristics of a 6 million-dollar helicopter come down to a wholesale cost of $250.00
( $290.00 to $400.00 for a unit encased in rip-stop nylon camping backpack units) per man
with a recommended distribution of three man packs per unit into the battle theater.
Anticipated effective ranging up to 1 mile per man pack unit. 
 
The foregoing is possible against military and commercial electronic systems.  Malicious
intent is a problem against civilian targets such as computer installations, bank and
operations support structures.  The override of security systems and any other systems
that manipulating frequencies affect is a given. 
   
In closing, the capability of the units discussed is within the capability of any person with
intent to create mischief.  The equipment outlined is nothing of major technical
wonderment, just a few simple block circuits mated to each other so that they work
together to produce the requested result. All of the described equipment and plans may
be in the hands of free thinkers and aggressors even if they do not know that they have
collected it.  While most security personnel do not have knowledge about how systems
may be used to corrupt other systems, or even how the average telephone or toaster
works, they will state that the technology represented in this paper is not  possible.  Experts
open the door to major disaster due to complete ignorance to a real world problem.