Intelligence is where you find it

TITLE:    Open Source Intelligence Oversight

ABSTRACT

Democracies offer their citizens almost unlimited access to intelligence.  Information
appears as whimsey, fact, retold stories, shared experiences, boasting, extrapolations,
etc.  Those mining for intelligence informatiion are coming in contact with tidbits from
unexpected sources enhanced by evolving connectivity.  Sobczak proposes to define the
sources of unsecured data resident in computers, e-mail communications and RF
transmissions in Government, Commerce and Industry.  Based on topics posted on Internet
web sites, in FTP repositories, chat room conversations, BLOGS, and archived in Public
Domain Bulletin Board Systems (PDBBS) repositories, focused researchers, using
commercial off-the-shelf data mining solutions, can access and harvest data from
hundreds, if not thousands, of information sources.

Sobczak proposes to identify open source intelligence information and secrets.  Sobczak
will identify existing policies, procedures, equipments and software that contribute to the
availability of open source intelligence at secure sites.  Sophisticated systems integration
has caused the term "programmatic error" to become a catchall for data losses that are not
readily explained.  Shell software capable of migration between and among operating
systems (REXX shell software is an example) can open forgotten back doors and trap
doors. The intelligence automation and data repository systems of the United States are
at risk and/or under attack from complacency.  As an example, the Unisys Deep
Submergence project (SOSUS) was compromised in 1990 at Unisys in Great Neck, New
York.  SOSUS continues to be open to interested parties twelve tears later.

NOTE: In this proposal Sobczak enumerates older study results to prevent breaches in
National Security.  This representative information was collected and structured from data
located at sources such as Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the USAF Philips Laboratory, the SDI (Pentagon basement), USAF/SAM/RSD
(Brooks AFB, TX), NAVAIR 055 (Pentagon), Computer Center (WPAFB Area B), USAF
Cryptological Support Center (Kelly AFB), USAF Stratcom (formerly the Strategic Air
Command) Offat AFB and its satellite office Omaha NE, the US Navy Electronic Laboratory
(New Hampshire Avenue, Washington, D.C.), and, Electronic Systems Division/MIT,
(Hanscom AFB, MA) between 1988 and 1997.  The referenced information is offered as
examples of readily available open source intelligence.

A SAMPLE OF OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE MANIPULATION

National Security and Corporate Propriety are at risk from the careless distribution of data.
Thomas V. Sobczak conceived an organization and logic flow necessary to define solutions
that create or explain information envisaged as proprietary and secret.  During the last
twenty years Sobczak has gathered and sold misplaced solutions and secrets, legally, to
Governments and Business.  This proposal is designed to make the reviewer aware of the
vulnerabilities of democracy.

BECOMING A PUNDIT

The quantity and quality of available information concerning any topic are frightening.
Anyone with access to Bulletin Board Systems (BBS), the INTERNET, News Groups or
University File Transfer Protocol (FTP) sites, or those willing to pay for information stored
in proprietary databases, can share access to vast repositories of incidental information.
Facts can be collected, organized, and structured using readily available information
models to define solutions and corporate or national secrets.

The rapid expansion of the Internet triggers egoists and egotists to share secrets with the
world.  In most cases, incremental comments are useless without a "Big Picture."
Intelligent people establish "Big Picture" boundaries.  In many cases' data considered
proprietary and secret in the United States is readily available offshore.  The global
economy contributes to insensitivity to proprietary facts and secrets.  Those conducting
Google-hack type searches do no more than play a lottery.  Most results are negative.
Secrecy is preserved through ignorance.

Hobbyists use commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware/software to clone current
systems.  Sobczak conceived Segment Indexed Integrated Databases (SIID) has validated
available information concerning mechanisms that disrupt automation.  Our initial effort
validates the premise of hi-tech system vulnerability.  During desert storm Sobczak
provided US Southern Command (SOCOM) information about use of Radio Frequencies
(RF) to detonate mines produced in Germany and Italy.  He provided access to "in-country"
hackers and to command and control communications.  The Thompson CSF backbone
integrating Iraqi Command and Control was readily available for spying. This large
telephone switch was programmed using AT&T's COSMOS Programming Language.
French and American Hackers defined this weakness and created code to corrupt the
switch.  SOCOM failed to take advantage of this weakness.   General Schoonmaker, than
a Colonel, bypassed this opportunity.  SIID identified RF conditions that cause both cruise
and Patriot Missile to divert from a target.  The accuracy of Sobczak unofficial research was
later supported in Raytheon Corporation Desert Storm after action reports.

Segment Integrated Indexed Databases (SIID) is a method/system that uses applied
science joined by Office Suite software to integrate dissimilar data originally hosted on
dissimilar hardware.  The SIID system allows islands of specific information to be isolated,
merged and manipulated for the benefit of users within any enterprise or by those seeking
to define secrets.

A large share of money spent to research new technologies results in warehoused
solutions.  Many researchers do not know how to market their creations.  The waste of
intellectual property is an extravagance taken for granted by those funded with Government
largess.  Useful research is seldom relocated.  The program explained herein was created
to benefit projects with limited resources. The SIID system began by finding answers for
Federal Program Managers attempting to look for solutions their contractors have missed.
Examples of how the system works set the stage for insecurity.

The Federal Government has tools that, when used non-traditionally, allow knowledge
integration to occur in a less complex manner than is presently evolving as data
warehouses.  Available methods that aid integration include the Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS), Group Technology (GT), Classification and Coding (GTCC), Integrated Definition
(IDEF), etc.   An artificial intelligence engine offered a means to drive the initial SIID prior
to integration using Office Suites.  NASA CLIPS was the original Artificial Intelligence (AI)
engine used to trigger integration.  The AI engine software was provided by the Johnson
Space Flight Center and NASA Langley.

SIID methodology is manufacturing technology refashioned to be generic.  SIID begins by
using a Work Breakdown Structure (family tree).  It expands by using Integrated
definition(IDEF) logic. Group Technology Classification and Coding (GTCC) cement
organization, i.e., Grouping like items or ideas.  The difference is that SIID can group ideas
rather than physical components.  Focus and control become evident as the relations
between facts and their intended use emerge.  An SIMPLIMATRIX (Simplified Matrix),
produces the data structure that suggests new conclusions.  Duplication and redundancy
are eliminated when logic and alternate common sense keywords are applied to narrow the
focus.

SIID knowledge engineering uses code structure constructed logical relations that allow
information-caching from dissimilar data base (file) structures hosted on dissimilar
hardware.

SIID precisely puts items of data in a classification matrix.  Eight dissimilar databases
integrated within the first SIID model produced a diverse universe of manufacturing
oriented technological information.  The process involved writing software to extract data
as a flat file, convert it to ASCII format, and transmit the ASCII to a host machine.  Sobczak
identified and merged equivalent data, structured the merged result and manipulated/
integrated the result using newly assigned common format tags (key words).  The source
DBMS and its host hardware were irrelevant to the process once we leech the data. The
modern SIID uses hundreds of search engines in dozens of nations to identify and collect
potentially related facts. 

SIID uses search engines to transition information and technology.  The evolution of
database architecture forms the basis for joining various islands of information.  An early
SIID effort involved simplifying the transfer of data between IBM, Honeywell and DEC
hardware.  This undertaking cost to the Air Force Wright Laboratory was almost three (3)
million dollars.  Data distribution occurred in a traditional and pedestrian fashion.  The
USAF Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) Project Office awarded a small
contract to Dr. Thomas V. Sobczak.  He used it to formalize a set of rules for data
integration that he termed SEGMENT INDEXED INTEGRATED DATABASES (SIID).   The
initial SIID logic showed a way to collect scientific research outputs and structure relevant
technology integration. SIID has since expanded to be ubiquitous.

Beyond the USA, SIID uses search engines in England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia,
China, Australia, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Israel, etc. Their results add alternate source
data to expand SIID results.

CONCEPTUALIZING NEW KNOWLEDGE

This example uses as its topic "the PROPHET." (AS/MLC-40)  Twenty domestic search
engines returned 17,000+ hits for the selected term. The Prophet Mohammed dominated
the results.  Topics fall victim to society.  The term PROPHET modified by (and/+) SIGINT
was substituted.  A more manageable 312 hits were revealed.  It is important to note that
the documents located had many titles.  The word PROPHET as related to SIGINT was
included somewhere in the document.  Results also pointed toward Foreign Military Sales
sites (Domestic and foreign) and to manufacturers in six foreign nations.  What is
considered proprietary or secret in the United States is not necessarily secret abroad.

A work breakdown structure of ideas was constructed using the search of results.  An SIID
search, almost always, identifies problems of semantics and dozens of tangential topics.
Upon adding key words to Search Engine results, more focused results were merged and
sorted.  The initial results make the "Tower of Babel" seem ordered.  This purposeful
confusion forced development of a common word structure for ease of future identification
and integration.  Sobczak created logic that adapted to crossovers, i.e., valid word
placement in more than one contextual level of the target Work Breakdown Structure.  We
re-titled every citation so that it contained both an SIID keyword and a generic keyword.
Sorting using the SIID keyword achieved commonality of meaning.  An early assumption
required three unrelated references to a concept or idea before it would be assumed
credible.

The PROPHET + SIGINT Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) keyword relationships partially
include:

                                             LEVEL             (1)         (2)            (3)                      (4)
               PROPHET
                         Prime Contractor
                                   Titan
                                    Other Contractors
                                                                                     CACI
                                                                                     Sytex
                                                                                     Sensytech
                                                                                     Tobyhanna Army Depot
                                                                                     Delfin Systems Corp.
                                                                                     Rockwell Collins
                                                                                    
                                                                Titan Subcontractors                   
                                   Thompson Racal Defence
                                   Tederam
                                   Thales Acoustics
               Military
                         AMC
                         CECOM
                                             PEO
                                             Engineering
                                             Logistics
                         TRADOC
                                             Field Manuals      
                         Intelligence School and Center
                                            Training Plans
                                            Technical Packages 
                         Fort LEWIS, WA
                                   XXX Intelligence Battalion
                         etc.
               Foreign Military Sales
                         GERMANY
                                 ADLER
                         UNITED KINGDOM                         
                                     BATES
                         FRANCE
                                     ATLAS
                         etc.
               Studies under blanket - Prophet Funding
                         Leviathon
                         Logistics
                         Quality
               Legacy Programs
                         Trailblaser
                         Trafficjam
                         Teammate
                         etc.
               Related Programs
                         ASAS-RWS and -L
                         DCGS-A
                         ACT
                         COP
                         FBCB2
                         FCS
                         WIN-T
                         etc.

In all about one hundred thirty (130) keywords were identified down five levels by applying
only five-hours effort to create an information structure.

Many terms appear at different levels in a topic stratum. The idea of Group Technology
(GT) is applied creatively.  In place of grouping like physical parts, SIID groups like ideas.
The result is akin to a Japanese Bonsai tree in shape.  It allowed any use of a term, at any
level in the WBS strata to be found and tracked as one rather than multiple entities.  The
net result of this procedure eliminates duplicate ideas made different only by their location
in the organization's strata.  The SIID data base management systems (DBMS) index
references fewer terms.

DISORGANIZATION FOR PROFIT

The Military, as is apparent from the PROPHET SIID, seeks noncompetitive procurement.
Sole-source contracting and MIPR (Internal funds transfers) are typical in PROPHET.

Contracting vagaries proliferate.  PROPHET has a five-block approach.  The SIID suggests
actions that forestall competition.  In place of one Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare
system, contracting gluttons create Block One, Electronic Support; Block two, Electronic
Attack; Block Three, Modern Signals (The Agile Signals); Block Four, SIGINT/MASINT
Fusion; and Block Five, Micro-sensors and Robotic Sensor Extensions.  Other sole source
comes about by the creation of undefined studies.  In the case of PROPHET,  LEVIATHON
studies were created.  In an SIID database search of twenty-one databases, the only
appearance of LEVIATHON happens in the R-2A Exhibit, i.e., Army RTD&E Budget Item
Justification.  LEVIATHON is a best kept secret.  If others know of its existence, they might
ask to compete.  Should one read the R-2A, he would suspect that a Beltway Contractor
hired a retiring military executive who went back to the well to gain job security from old
friends for his new employer.  Should someone ask about LEVIATHON, he will find it
classified for National Security Reasons.

USING COMMON SENSE

Free spirit researchers rebel at man-made rules put in the path of their search for free
access to anything in electronic format.  They menace American technological supremacy
by carrying academic freedom to the extreme.  Individuals given the proper stimuli, reach
out beyond the system and exceed the norms governing creativity.  Unstructured solutions
exist as a fact of our everyday lives.  Often, we know them by terms appropriate to the
industry in which we toil.   SIID spotlights data availability.

Creative minds are frustrated by rules that place creativity at a premium and then deny the
fact and attainment of creativity.  Frustrated researchers channel their abilities and search
for satisfaction in other directions. One result is the manipulation of proprietary information.
There are no secrets.  Knowledge of any topic can be located, collected and misused.

Thousands of experiments and reports exist but belong to no specific author.  They are
available at minimum or no-cost.  One can review files of Freeware and Shareware, News
Groups, Chats, BLOGS, or sales/marketing literature on-line in order to view hundreds of
facts and no-cost solutions.

A plethora of available information allows a novice to collect, trade and succeed without
experiencing the consequences of failure.  Professionally prepared information comes
available from people who satisfy their egos or insecurities by sharing too much proprietary
information while providing copies of otherwise unattainable documents.  Military
Intelligence becomes an oxymoron when well secured primary web sites stop head-on
access but permit linking behind the firewall from other poorly secured Military web sites.
Using human engineering one can gain an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) ID and
Password.  Conservatism allows an intruder to function unknown to those responsible for
securing data.
    
Managers can locate volumes of detail and trivia revealed beyond the generally available
training, operations and maintenance manuals provided by system integrators, equipment
manufacturers, and Logisticians.  In our PROPHET example the ABCA Parts List, System
Training Plan for the Prophet (AS/MLC-40) and the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized)
After Action Report, among many, are freely available.  In a paperless society thousands
of e-mail entries are stored electronically (and insecurely) as reference resources.  SIID
located several hundred pieces of correspondence within and without CECOM referencing
C++ for PROPHET and MMI (a laptop used by brigade intelligence).

Thousands of federally funded outputs (Reports, Studies, Thesis and Dissertation) are
located in thousands of File Transfer Protocol (FTP) based  libraries.  Hobbyist Bulletin
Boards (still functioning) house results that lay fallow.  A researcher needs a pencil and pad
to keep a record of the search path taken.  The earliest SIID studies were slowed by
tangential reading about topics of momentary interest.  Many later studies were made
easier by several hundred structures warehoused since the first SIID.

In a manner similar to a lawyer examining a contractual agreement and annotating it for all
possibilities, the information collector or spy, identifies every foible and weakness that
human nature allows.  A serious investigator can learn a great deal from the volume and
quality of research leavings available for sharing.  Ego stroking goes far to amplify results.

Targeting the sources of identifiable original research is as easy as reading a technical
magazine for a keyword topic, followed by accessing the directory of knowledge located
by a search engine  Sobczak has defined dozen's of Bulletin Board System (BBS) data
sources by a self developed quality rating system.  Upper end BBS, chat rooms, and
private news groups are frequented by advanced degree and experienced professionals.
Special interest groups rival post-post-graduate seminars.

As PhD's specialize, so does the prudent investigator.  When a person attains super
privilege (access to everything) and the proper level of involvement, information is passed
about freely.  The USAF Weapons Laboratory High Powered Electro Magnetic Pulse
project, the Rifle Laser pulse weapon at Harry Diamond Labs, or the CECOM Prophet EW
sensor project (used as an example above) can be isolated and defined down to a third tier
subcontractor or code specific level by persistent researchers.  Unlimited access to Army
Knowledge Online (AKO) eases the way.  Monitoring cost overruns is another easy way
to locate problems (potential topics for further research).

Most systems can be thrown into disorder or the curtain can be raised to allow a view of
ongoing disorder.  Most secrets are vulnerable to exploitation.

EXAMPLES FROM TWENTY YEARS OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH

SIID studies identify and focus knowledge to create new products and markets.  Waldes
Kohinoor (NY) found they owned a tin-zinc over-coating that made cadmium plate
environmentally acceptable. It was marketed to the USAF.  Solarex Corporation (MD) found
a new use for previously scrapped photovoltaic slivers. The poor quality sliver tiles were
connected in series on the roofs of university buildings to produce sufficient electricity to
generate ninety percent of the building's electrical requirements.  Standard Oil of Indiana
gained funding from the DOE for this test.

Sobczak-acquainted the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Civilian Security Chief about the
vulnerability of SDI HP 3000 computers, located in the Pentagon Basement, to an
incursion.  His military counterpart from NSA had refused to acknowledge any vulnerability.
The story was featured in Federal Computer Week.  This occurred as an output tangent
to another SIID study.

Segment Indexed Integrated Databases (SIID) has been used for the benefit of the USAF
to locate and develop solutions to problems thought to be without solution.  SIID evaluated
the AFWL/ML/IMC/MM program (Air Force Wright Laboratories Material Laboratory
Integrated Manufacturing Control /Material Management).  GE developed a $3,000,000+
solution.  The test model was implemented by Northrup costing an additional $1,000,000.
Sobczak modeled an IMC/MM SIID, based on USAF Integrated Computer Aided
Manufacturing (ICAM) specifications.  He duplicated using a paper model, the $3,000,000
project using Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) hardware and software costing $39,000.

Sobczak was hired by ASD/B1B/MOS (Aeronautical Systems Division B-1B Supersonic
Bomber Program Manufacturing Operations Support) to research a solution to soft metal
cutting problems caused when trimming titanium wing skins.  His soft metals manufacturing
SIID identified a high pressure-water based cutting solution used to make aluminum storm
windows in Germany.  The $200,000 solution replaced a $9,000,000 research investment
by the prime contractor.  Sobczak developed a COTS SIID for WPAFB/AFRL/XPX (Air
Force Research Laboratory Experimental Programs) that eliminated a custom designed
heads up display for the preliminary Stealth Fighter Aircraft.

In 1990, Sobczak demonstrated at the School of Aerospace Medicine Radiation Sciences
Division  (USAF/SAM/RSD) the ease with which overlaid chip embedded code controlling
a VDT snap back mechanism affects operators.  The tests included: Capture and
modification of the refresh rate (snap back mechanism) of a video tube; disorientation of
people using: Light and Sound, stimulating vibration in a tooth filling to cause Pain and
Inner Ear `voices, and the triggering of an involuntary nerve synapse.   Aggressive uses
of collected data are endless.  Anything from a dish-antenna driver through a radar
guidance system can be manipulated or destroyed.  SIID research determined most
commercial sensors are not protected.  Monitored signal inputs can be used to produce a
negative psychological effect.  Aggressors might target our example's (PROPHET)
programming.  74,000 lines of C++ code for SIGINT provide a target.  200,000 lines of
Application code for the MMI interface NT/4 to the PROPHET are equally at risk.

A SIID study of Radio Frequencies located extensive scientific research about
psychological operations originating in Russia.  These targeted equipment operators.  SIID
identified specific areas of research and tracked occurrences. By judicious trading he
obtained direct dial telephone numbers of Medical School computers and Government data
repositories engaged in defining psychological manipulation.  It is feasible to affect brain
cells by software produced low frequency waves.  Sobczak's goal was to alter
psychological states (create mood changes) and to transmit stimuli that trigger suggestions
and/or commands directly into the brain.  SIID results showed the way.

Defense and the CIA had become paranoid about loss of mind manipulation leadership.
MK ULTRA (ARTICHOKE), MKDELTA, MKNAOMI, MKRESEARCH, BLUEBIRD (renamed
ARTICHOKE by DCI) and some continuations of the earlier CHATTER Project (1947) were
authorized to regain mind manipulation leadership.  Sobczak gained access to the research
produced in these projects.  He produced an SIID that focused unfocused research.

SIID research proved that electromagnetic fields raising body temperature by less than 1
degree Celsius result in somatic change.  Chemical, physiological and behavioral changes
occur within "windows" of frequency and energy continua.  The SIID suggests brain cells
will be reachable diversely, flexibly and routinely in the not too distant future.  Sobczak
showed  SAM/RSD a means to use software to affect people.  Philips Laboratory and
MITRE staff were provided demonstrations using corrupted systems in a Public Park.

Exploration of the relationship of computing devices to a cross-membrane phenomenon is
not documented anywhere in American unclassified publications.  The relationships were
glaring within the SIID structure.  SIID provides a high risk but enormous payback potential
to secure systems from energy aggression that subverts operator ability to function.
Sobczak extended the key factors located by SIID to determine how a computer-based
soliton (earlier called an exciton) might be created in software and triggered to affect
people.  The potential for an ultimate virus was defined.  The SIID results were leaked by
US Army Vint Hill Farms (VA) and immediately objected to by Business Week magazine
in an editorial.

Kill potential of RF transmitted software code is a topic of discussion within the electronic
hobbyist culture in both western, eastern and pacific rim countries.  SIID has monitored,
collected and structured text dealing with signal manipulation, jamming, transceiver
substitution and attempts at entering and controlling an electronic system via RF
transmissions.  Sobczak has monitored volumes of malicious code sets, beyond Viruses,
as the medium to be injected into computers and circuits.  

SIID research determined Russian mathematicians had been concerned with solitons
(initially referred to as excitons) long before Americans became interested.  It is
conceivable that researchers, Davydov, Drazin and Boris Ponomarev, functioning under
the wing of Uri Andropov achieved workable results that warranted further testing. Did the
Russians use RF to attack the Moscow Embassy?  Our Government paid staffers bonuses
just in case what the State Department denied, happened.

In 1991 Sobczak showed AIR-055 how SIID found an FLTSATCOM link could be used to
port UNIX "do loops" and REXX code to Harris hardened but poorly secured Digital
Equipment VAX computers on an operational aircraft carrier.  Sobczak created an
integrated software security solution (V-PHAGE) modeled on the NSA
compartmentalization model using SIID results.

When he was Chairman of the Manufacturing Controls Division of the Computer and
Automated Systems (CASA) Division of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers (SME) Dr.
Sobczak created an SIID to simplify the application of manufacturing terms across Industry.
His successful SIID was adopted and published by the SME and by  the International Labor
Organization (ILO) of the United Nations as the first draft Manufacturing Terminology World
Standard.  The Society of Manufacturing Engineers has recognized and published Dr.
Sobczak's Manufacturing Terms Baseline under the title: A Glossary of Terms Used in
Computer Aided Manufacturing.  By tagging like ideas Sobczak reduced 16,000 terms to
a manageable 4,300 definitions without loss of content or context.  Sobczak repeated this
exercise to produce Configuration and Logistics Glossaries for the USAF at WPAFB.

COMMON SENSE IS UNCOMMON

Investigators create undocumented research.  Problems can be solved using innovative
results from chance sources.  Sobczak defines the universe of original investigation created
outside Government and/or commercial industries.  SIID locates pure and applied research
to create results that produce salient solutions or new intelligence.  Based on using the
Internet and Public Domain Bulletin Board Systems (PDBBS), hobbyist researchers
(usually PhD level and beyond) employ  COTS components and software to manipulate
state-of-the-art technology.  Imagine integrating the theories of a thousand Einstein or
Edison clones.

The window of opportunity to stop an impending attack by terrorists is ignored.
Programmatic time bombs are hidden among the millions of lines of trusted computer code
that functions as a part of any modern electronic environments such as JSTARS and BMO.
Code reuse saves money but it works for our enemies.
  
Decision makers ignore the concepts that led to success by the American colonists in the
prosecution of our revolutionary war.  Early Americans did not follow tradition.  They made
new rules to fit the situation at hand.  Provocateurs have thrown away the rules defenders
expect.  IP spoofing is a simple example.  Future spoofing will include a virtual node to
enhance sniffing and the volume of validated collectibles.

We believe it is significant:
 
     1. When unanticipated technologies are introduced with no prior knowledge or
preparation by a guardian, the unanticipated aggression will achieve decisive results.

     2. The probability of American  involvement against western technology in localized
incursions (Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq) is high due to the large and growing
inventory of surplus, previously used, systems available worldwide.  Modern battle plans
do not anticipate this probability.  They are vulnerable to the threat posed.
 
     3.  Electronic Warfare systems available to an American Manager are not useful
against re-engineered western technology.   The use of tactics and counter force to insure
operations requires training.  Training is not readily available.  The probability of defense
against an  incursion is greatly reduced.  It may be nil.

     4. Western  equipments and schema are geared to aggression conceived in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.  They are ineffective to assure survivability among
random, unfocused threats from equals.
 
Modern systems depend heavily on electronic technology.  SIID studies suggest this
technology itself constitutes a vulnerability.  It is foolish to consider facing unanticipated
aggression without the advantage of knowing enemy strategies and methods.  Constructing
non-traditional SIID models, necessary to developing hardware and training programs to
assure survival of the unsuspecting against hobbyists and terrorists, is not happening. 

American electronic countermeasures are behind the power curve based on text SIID has
located.  Aggressors exhibit potential far beyond that for which they are given credit.
Sobczak has re-engineered a sampler of these SIID situated technologies.  American
security is at risk.

In the past twenty years SIID analyzed inputs from hundreds of web sites and several
thousand Bulletin Board Systems in the United States, Europe, the Pacific Rim, the Mid-
East, South America, and Russia on a limited basis.  The imbalance of communications
facilities outside the United States makes the collection of aggressor inputs more difficult.
Conversely, American freedom gives aggressors an advantage.  We identified about one
dozen sources willing to discuss data collection that benefits an aggressor.  Most enemy
equipments are clones of western equipments. (See Booz, Allen Hamilton Study available
from the Government Printing Office and Papers from Monterey, Fort Levenworth, Fort
McNair and the Carlyle Barracks.)
  
Sobczak  is extending SIID knowledge to the systems marketed in the third world.  This is
being accomplished by polling military and INTERNET special interest groups to collect
data to round out our study universe.  Bulletin Boards in Africa, Israel and Poland have
been most helpful in explaining the functioning of Russian and Eastern European RIAD-
BASED equipments.

EXPOSING A UNIVERSE OF SECRETS
 
As you review the foregoing experiences, you can see the chance for small scale urban
terrorism.  The November 24th, 1987 edition of the Baltimore Sun reported residents of
Frederick, MD had problems with unexplained operation of electronic garage door openers.
Device owners returned them and found in the store that the units worked perfectly.
Nearby, the U.S. Army operates a major communications center for both domestic and
international traffic.  An Army spokesman stated their transmitters were not radiating
signals that would affect the garage door transceivers.  When the transmitters were shut
down, the garage door openers worked properly.  While the Army stated that they were not
the problem.  The "problem" did go away when the Army narrowed frequency bandwidth
and eliminated side lobes coming from the transmitting antenna.    PROPHET used in Iraqi
Freedom can be manipulated by savvy terrorists.  Without Unmanned aircraft (UAV) to
scout, the Third Infantry was forced to send a patrol to check any location generating radio
signals within the scope of the PROPHET technical package.  The patrol was at risk of
being set up for ambush.

An aggressor has the capability to collect and/or modify RF and microwave signals if he
has an antenna attached to receiving equipment.  Most commercial units include signal
amplification circuits to adjust for the ever growing background noise generated by normal
commercial stations and reception characteristics.  You can read information generated on
a video display tub (VDU) in any locality as easily as you were tuning a mechanical TV
receiver.  SIID suggests that those who retained their old black and white Television
receivers with mechanical tuners own an SIGINT weapon.

Consider the number of micro and single board computers in standard commercial devices.
Next, imagine the possible effect of a hobbyist ELINT OR SIGINT operation.  A host of
vulnerabilities is opened in the surveillance information gathering  operation.  Terrorists
have a wide-open way of monitoring the daily practices and transactions of  targets with
complete impunity.  Security is completely unguarded due to the lack of belief in solutions
created outside the system.     

In our SIID observations, we have seen a wide spectrum of emitted signals with a strong
signal between 9.0 and 9.250 MHz for the display of standard text scrolling. Better signal
display was found at the lower frequencies of 9 MHz. Monitor frequencies were found in
the area of 11 through 19.5 - 20 MHz.   Printer frequencies are in the range of 140 to 200
MHz.  Disk operations were detected in the ranges of 88 to 250 MHz. Overall frequency
generation was from four through 500 MHz.  The modem was found between 28 and 300
MHz.   All in all, discovery of radiated or transmitted signals transmitting software code is
technology leading to tomorrow's insecurities.  This logic is not addressed by the
PROPHET or any other EW design.

Malicious intent is a problem against civilian targets such as computer installations, bank
and operations support structures by overriding security systems and any other systems
that may be affected by manipulated frequencies.  
    
This technology is well within the range of individuals intending to create mischief.
Equipment we have located using SIID is nothing of technical sophistication, just a few
simple block circuits integrated to produce the required result.  All located equipments and
plans are available to free thinkers and aggressors capable of structuring searches and
search results.  Most technologist intellectuals do not accept the fact that functioning
systems for intelligence collection have been designed by hackers and terrorists.  Data is
freely available to corrupt systems.

SOBCZAK EXPERIENCES COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE:

Sobczak's early investigations classified mechanisms that allow data mining to occur in
computing architectures.  He created modified computer BIOS to prevent introduction of
unauthorized access, i.e., VIRUS and sniffer code string inclusions. Sobczak took part in
dialogues on hacker/phreaker BBS.  Sobczak duplicates hacker bravado to create
automated procedures beyond stated government security policy.  Sobczak performed
comparative and relational analyses of user friendliness, code structure and procedure,
complexity of code, effect on data transfer and processing speeds, and bandwidth levels
affected. The foregoing create open source intelligence data mining criteria

Sobczak identified situations that go unnoticed between low end computing devices and
secure networks.  Sobczak created personal access mechanisms that encrypt code and
data at transfer.  Sobczak researched software to trigger access code failure.  Failed
access triggers traps and purges that prevent further access attempts. Sobczak created
Approved Private Entry (APE) for First National City Bank, New York. The system was
described in a two article set by Security Magazine.

RF transmissions extend unauthorized data collection to wireless, cellular and satellite.
These systems are for the most part neither fully encrypted nor secured. We proved Air
Force One to be at risk both on Andrews AFB and in the air.

Functioning within many networks are sniffer code mechanisms that affect security and
mimic operations.   The Morris worm proved this point.  Nuisance viruses such as the two
hundred seventy eight WORD macro virus variations are tips of a childish mischief.
Sobczak determined interdicting code sets need not be written as virus.  He wrote REXX
sets for V.ADM. Dunleavy, AIR 0055, Navy Pentagon. They migrated from desktop to VAX
to an IBM Main Frame.

Sobczak determined that one cannot performance test for embedded code sets triggered
by combinations of unique conditions.  Potentially dangerous access code sets are reused
thanks to Federal Cost cutting (Code Reuse)  Sobczak researched mechanisms to identify
illicit code set reuse.

Sobczak told the CIA about the appearance and interest, by several former Soviet
Republics, Russia, China, Columbia and Israel, in US network and BBS source lists. He
located extensive research in psychological operations originating in Russia affecting
equipment operators. Sobczak identified specific areas of interest and tracked occurrences.
By judicious trading we obtained direct dial telephone numbers of Medical School and
Government data repositories.

Using a modified mechanical television receiver, Sobczak learned to copy VDU screens
from machines as far away as a mile to video tape or to another computer screen.  Wave
guides were required to focus commercial off-the-shelf (Radio Shack) parabolic antenna.
Sobczak copied letters of credit from Japanese Banks received at the Port Authority
Teleport (Richmond County, NY), word processing emissions at UN Headquarters (NYC)
and dozens of meaningless home PC screens located in his test area.  Wave guides to
narrow focus were created for Sobczak by HAM Radio enthusiasts.

Positive uses of manipulative code sets are endless.  Anything from a dish antenna driver
through a radar guidance system can  be accessed, manipulated or destroyed by implanted
code.

His next experiment was born out of a BBS report of a midwest hacker who studies
microwave.  He took control of a transmission tower outside Columbus, OH. ATT and
Columbus daily newspapers validated his claim.  This potential for aggressive data
collection is enormous.

Sobczak purchased a BEARCAT 16 scanner. The plans for a microwave transmitter and
needed wave guides to narrow signals were available from electronics magazines and on
anarchist BBS.  We successfully duplicated data collection with six repetitions in as many
days.  Sobczak research determined sensors are not protected.  Codes can be used to
produce an open access.

Sobczak determined it feasible to affect brain cells by software produced low frequency
waves. His goal was to alter psychological states (mood changes) and possibly to transmit
stimuli that trigger suggestions and/or commands directly into the human brain.

Russian military research proved a soliton wave propagates suddenly acquired energy, or
energy imparted by a shock, without dispersing it. Sobczak's initial data mining found that
soliton waves began being considered relevant in high energy physics and  in the fusion
program in 1985.  Sobczak began locating software to simulate the soliton wave form as
a substitute to energy amplification.

As a manipulative tool, one must visualize the human brain and its environment as
structures of RF waves. Available experimental software creates pseudo shock waves.
Modern electronics can be configured to create a range of resonances utilizing the
flexibility, speed and accuracy inherent in the circuitry of a computing device and certain
of its peripheral components.  Sobczak showed Dr. Albanese at SAM/RSD a means to use
software solitons to affect people. 

Sobczak located Dr. Albanese during research concerning the effects of radiation
generated by over-the-horizon radar on the general population.  Sobczak examined an
ULTRIX VAX cluster at SAM that was already at risk to hackers.

Student hackers from the University of Dayton tried to interdict the operational software
suite of SOCOM's MC-130H to revenge perceived slights given by SOCOM Pathfinders.
These hackers unknowingly made practical use of software soliton theory. 

In 1991 Sobczak showed AIR-055 (Vice Admiral Dunleavy, Admiral of the Lower Half
Hickey and Captain John Paul Jones) how an FLTSATCOM link could be used to port
UNIX "do loops" written in REXX to Harris hardened but poorly secured VAXES on an
operational aircraft carrier.  The Navy leased SATCOM channels from private operators.
Sobczak crossed channels to capture a navy-leased link.  The UNIX system on capital
ships has yet to be secured.  UNIX has many security features that users fail to implement.
Hackers migrate UNIX government networks without fear.

Sobczak called the central exchange of a military facility involved in weapon systems
development to gain access.  He asked for the telephone number of the computer center.
This was easily obtained.  At the data center he told the secretary answering that he
needed the direct dial number of the computer room so we might talk to a SE.  In 10 of 10
tries the computer room telephone number was given automatically without thought as to
the consequences of the act.  As no one ever calls the computer room except with
problems so the request for a clean line for a system error log upload produced current
telephone numbers 8 of 10 times.

The two hundred fifty odd passwords of Mr. Morris Jr are effective adjuncts to password
hacking (code breaking) software like Deluxe Hack or (I'm just a) FH.

HP's TI990's, than in use by the USAF, were the easy targets.  HP 990 security in the F-16
System Program Office (SPO), Bldg 16 at WPAFB Area B was nonexistent.  The targeted
machine managed life cycle budget projections.  Intelligence gathering mixed with common
sense allows a multitude of data to be identified.  The F-16 SPO TI990 was linked the
higher commands, OALC (Utah),  and Prime Contractor computers in Fort Worth.

Sobczak has arrangements with individuals we consider expert in the ability to convert
code from language A to language B within and among OS. We have found that these
experts take code sets we obtain and convert it to minicomputer and mainframe code in
hours.
                                                 
The Sobczak team for intelligence research includes hardware specialists.   At the
midrange level a code can be placed on a machine using an REXX Shell in  a manner that
defies human detection.  Further, the code set destroys itself on execution leaving no trace
of its prior existence. 

In 1993 Sobczak told the DIA that DOD had a problem.  Rumor in the ether said that the
Director of DARPA (Gary Denman) had brought his girl friend (IBM Rep) from his last post
(WPAFB) to Washington.  Her large corporation received an abnormal amount of research
awards.  At the time of our research the buzz word for large scale funding at DARPA was
MCM (Multi-chip Module).  At a meeting in the Pentagon cafeteria protagonists who wanted
to blackmail DARPA were almost identified.  AF Special Investigations using Pentagon
Police and following a tip raided the cafeteria. 

As in most things military, snafu ruled.  The Pentagon Police arrested some minor
uninvolved hackers (the wrong potential criminals) who happened to be having a 2600-type
meeting.  The hackers were released with apologies and the attempt to suborn the DARPA
Director continued until someone leaked the story to the Washington Post.

During 1994 and 1995 Sobczak concentrated his research into intelligence and technology
collection skewed to reuse code sets that can be modified.  Available intelligence about
weapons research is everywhere.  Sobczak told the Naval Investigative Service about
applications software that produced logistics models for the F-14 and F-18.  Working
system simulation with nomenclature and parts lists were available on Foreign  Bulletin
Board Systems.  The NIS at Suitland Parkway in a Washington, D.C. suburb said not to
worry.  Contractors sometime transfer information using the unsecured INTERNET.

No one cared that the node Sobczak manipulated was found in then communist Europe
(Warsaw, Poland).  Worse the same source taught Sobczak how to access and manipulate
the Defense Data Network. (DDN), a training ground for hackers.

The SDI was at risk because the SDI Computer Operations Staff did not remove Installation
System Engineers IDs and Passwords.  MGR.SYS opened dozens of secure HP 3000s to
interrogation.  Further, links from the Pentagon to the National Test Bed Facility, SAIC,
Boeing, etc. were available through networked computers at Army Missile Command,
Huntsville Arsenal, AL.  Using perverted wisdom all telephone exchanges were changed
except for those interfacing computers.  Hackers could not talk to people yet they had
access to all facility computers.

During Operation Desert Storm, Sobczak offered an operations officer (Major Gus Taylor)
at SOCOM in Florida the opportunity to monitor Iraqi C2 (Command and Control).  Sobczak
had access to an Iraqi National Telephone Thompson CSF backbone running under
COSMOS (an old Telephone Company Operating System).  Sobczak chatted daily with
four individuals in Kuwait.  They provided insight that was passed to SOCOM.

Many intrusions occur in systems because intruders are using lawful IDs and Passwords.
The problem grows out of proportion to reality.  Most intrusions go unreported.  Those in
charge hide intrusions from higher levels of Management to protect their jobs.  Trusted
employees are frequent culprits.   Sobczak created an integrated software security solution
(V-PHAGE) modeled on the NSA compartmentalization model.  The USAF/CSC said that
properly installed his solution is unbeatable.  It protects stored intelligence.

Sobczak was able to locate a General Officer at WPAFB (Eagleton?) who as Commander
of the F-16 SPO had an ID and Password assigned that he did not use.  This afforded
backup access into WPAFB computers.

In 1995 while visiting a contractor in Arlington's IDA building Sobczak met an engineer from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).  Weather trapped him in Arlington, VA
for three days during an ice/snow storm.  This engineer was a great source of insight for
security research.  He told Sobczak about the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
Hacker Project.  The US Army was spending millions at that time to find and arrest hackers
who might seek Army secrets.

LLNL and LANL competed for the same security funding.  LLNL was funded by USAF
Cryptological Support Center at Kelly AFB, TX.  LANL was funded by the Army Intelligence
Agency.  LLNL leaked information about the LANL Hacker project to the hacker community.
Hackers went on to mislead LANL computer scientists.  The Army spent millions to collect
garbage.  Dr. (Col) Alexander ignored Sobczak's warnings.

We (LLNL Engineer and I) spent most of our time trading stories.  He explained the Sniffer
attacks on LLNL before LLNL Management could deny their occurrence.  About 30,300
DOD computers were interdicted by hackers using sniffers.  Drug dealers from Columbia
paid European hackers and trusted government employees to locate secrets in the DEA
and USCG databases.  The American-Jewish hacker community helped the Israeli
government to create a shopping list of secret American Technologies.  Sobczak identified
insecurities and created solutions to negate potential attacks.  He was not believed as he
did not have clearances necessary to the knowledge he possessed.

The experience of knowing about things hidden within security classifications is stressful.
While visiting a Manhattan hotel a Russian National approached Sobczak.  He gave
Sobczak a "CCCP" gold pin.  He said was an Olympic lawyer yet he wanted to purchase
intelligence and security knowledge.  The Russians' sources claimed Sobczak intelligence
research results were focused and relevant to their commercial goals. 

Sobczak called the FBI.  An FBI Agent was assigned.  Some months later while having
dinner in a Queens, NY restaurant two men started a conversation with Sobczak.  They
happened to be officers from a Russian ship docked in Brooklyn, NY.  They invited
Sobczak to see their new computers.  He wondered how strangers knew about his
involvement with computers.  The FBI was again involved.  Foreign intelligence appears
to equal or exceed that available to US agencies here at home.  Foreigners, particularly
those involved with the UN and Trade Missions buy American technology for scientists at
home to duplicate.  American egos tend to give technology freely.

The United States does not have legislation that prohibits signal collection.  SIGINT for the
masses is practiced by hackers.  It can be as simple as listening to CB or SSB channels.
The equipment and tools hackers use are defined on the Internet.  Knowing  frequencies
and bandwidths used by computer equipment and peripheral devices help make some
collectors, super spies.

DEA wires agents who function as drug buyers are wired.  When they arrest the dealer,
they have tapes of the transaction.  Anyone with a BEARCAT scanner can clip a lead and
listen to the .5 watt transmissions if they are in range and locate the appropriate frequency.

Computer weapons beyond those that target Information warfare floods the net.  Sobczak
located twenty-five RF weapons with schematics, narrative plans, parts list and test plans.
The potential for multiple hits to verify data collected in a universe of one hundred million
users is great.  Twelve years ago Sobczak provided the USAF with code that created
enough friction (heat) to disable a BIOS chip (provided to Cpt. White, USAF/CSC).
.
PROPOSAL

     Sobczak proposes to identify, design and structure an Open Source Intelligence
Oversight System.

     Phase One -  Defining the structure of the Open Source Intelligence universe

     Sobczak will survey sources worldwide to define topical levels relevant to
Intelligence data mining using SIID logic.  Using the resources at our disposal we will
produce a report defining sources identified as basis for a workable collection scheme.
 
     Phase Two -  Configuring an open source intelligence data mining system

     Sobczak will determine available knowledge concerning the vulnerabilities and
methods to exploit vulnerabilities for systems and equipments in use in commercial, military
and hobbyist intelligence communities.  Sobczak will structure the information collected to
build a model that integrates unanticipated intelligence sources.  Sobczak will suggest a
plan to develop demonstration modeling the data mining system.  To be estimated at the
completion of Phase One.

     Phase Three - Develop plans and equipments necessary to implement a Beta test
SIID data mining unit.  To be estimated at completion of Phase Two. 

RESUMES

Thomas V.  Sobczak
                   
Thomas V. Sobczak employs several individuals and retains the services of other
professionals as independent consultants.