Cataloging COTS RF Components

When Sobczak created the Cadillac Weapon System he evaluated several complex means to
stop RF signals.  He experimented with single board computers.  They worked well but produced
complex and costly solutions.  Developing a Tesla weapon was easily the most cost effective
approach.  The complexity of our studies created MIRAGE.  Unfortunately Defense mis-managers
wanted the problem solved before they would commit funds.  Our experience showed that our ideas
were stolen and given to large contractors.  (Check our proposal aginst Vint Hill and Aberdeen). 
We know this to be fact because serveral large contractors asked for explanations of the fast single
board computers and the software that moves the process from the initial target identification through
to a final solution about five processor steps later.  This proposaldefined off-the-shelf devices available
to any user who realizes he can disrupt complicated systems simply for a minimum cost.

                      UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL

Basic Information
 
     (1)  Thomas V. Sobczak, Consultants
          PO Box 0433
          Baldwin, New York 11510
          (516) 623-6295
                 
     (2)  Contact point(s) for  technical  personnel to be contacted for evaluation and
negotiation:
 
                              Thomas V. Sobczak, Ph.D., P.E.
                              Owner
 
          Contact point(s) for  business  personnel to be contact for evaluation and
negotiation:
 
               Thomas V. Sobczak, Ph.D., P.E.
               Owner    

          (3)  Identify and analyze RF and Microwave off-the-shelf equipments that
introduce malicious code into firmware, middleware, and, software.

          (4)  Submitted 6/30/006
 
          (5)  Dr. Thomas V. Sobczak, Owner, is authorized to represent Thomas V.
Sobczak, Consultants.
 

_______________________________
Thomas V. Sobczak PhD
Owner
 
TITLE:

Identify and analyze RF and Microwave off-the-shelf equipments that introduce malicious
code into firmware, middleware, and, software.

.
ABSTRACT
 
System electronics are at risk.  Unanticipated electromagnetic hazards exist undetected
by agencies charged with securing against failures.   We believe, based upon what we
have noted on INTERNET and computer Bulletin Board Systems (BBS), that hobbyists are
using unsophisticated off-the-shelf electronic components to create and transmit code that
disrupts equipments and systems.  Sobczak proposes to identify available technological
information concerning mechanisms that transmit software code and signal patterns to
disrupt systems. This proposal analysis of system circuitry optimizing available
technologies developed by computer hackers and ham operators worldwide.

PROPOSED TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES
 
Our research will concentrate on identifying off-the-shelf components that can be
integrated to manipulate and/or jam the software controlling the operation of a system or
network.
 
Sobczak will identify and poll information sources here and abroad to establish the state
of awareness concerning signal-based weapons and countermeasures.  These sources
will be evaluated against traditional technologies available domestically.  A conclusion will
be made as to the feasibleness of using these technologies to subvert or manipulate
systems software.  Documentation of informational sources in sufficient detail to assure
acceptability by any reviewing agency, will accompany this phase of the study.
 
Next, Sobczak will utilize the first phase results to produce validity studies.  Media sources
will be used to verify the activities of the hobbyist community.  In this way, proof of validity
will emanate from unbiased sources.
 
The attack mechanism will be suitable to the degree of sophistication required for
penetration and will meet "in system" execution parameters.  A virus which attempts to
shell the controller chip in order to take control of a VDT snap-back transformer will
significantly differ from an attempt to null or confuse the averaging mechanism of a
bounced back signal for command, control, communications, and computer (C4I) systems.
 
The final objective of the study will be to create an array of strategies that identify and
prevent the injection of RF that corrupt a system or network.  Based upon validated
information, each strategy identified will be defined with a probability factor for success
estimated.   

At the completion of the proposed research newly created knowledge will allow the identity
of COTS equipments that manipulate weapon systems or their components with a degree
of certainty that does not now exist.  This study will provide the basis for the definition of
countermeasures ranging from awareness training to Artificial Intelligence (AI) integrated
into hardware.

STUDY-RELATED EXPERIENCE

In 1989, the USAF/ESD decided Sobczak research about Computer Virus as a Weapon
was a potential national resource. Virus weapons were not acceptable.  Business Week's
Technology Editor wrote an editorial decrying the potency of Sobczak research.  Viruses
created by Sobczak experiments in 1989 and made public by trusted government
employees were mimicked in the Fort Sill virus that affected 5000 PCs allocated to Desert
Shield/Storm..

Sobczak's early research classified mechanisms that allow problems to occur in current
computing architectures.  He created enhancements to low-end computer BIOS to prevent
introduction of corruption, i.e., VIRUS and broken code strings. Sobczak took part in
dialogues on hacker/phreaker BBS.  Sobczak duplicates hacker bravado to append logic
beyond traditional government policy.  Sobczak performed comparative and relational
analyses of user friendliness versus code structure and procedure, versus complexity of
algorithm, versus effect on data transfer and processing speeds, versus the RF frequency
levels affected. These criteria dictate security solution criteria to prevent corruption and
dissuade attackers by programmed harsh response.

Sobczak designed an encrypted VIRUS guaranteed to destroy unauthorized  users on a
network.  Electronic On-Line Integrated Network Security System (EOLINSS) is an
application where a signed virus is dispatched upon connect to verify the validity of the
receiving station.  If the receiving station acknowledges the virus with a proper signature
normal operation happens.  Failure to verify causes the receiver to be neutralized.  If both
ends of the connection are validated, the system continues to function sending random
virus code during transmission so as to affect any interloper who tries to listen. The system
works to the point that data collected to a tape recorder or CD/RW will corrupt a hard drive
and memory even when it is read into the device off line.

Sobczak identified problems that go unnoticed between low end devices and networks.
He created a hardware device, driven  by firmware that requires code and data to be
filtered to stop execution.  Sobczak researched how to excite corrupt code to execute and
fail.  Execution triggers firmware traps and purges that prevent virus execution.

RF transmissions extend virus potency to wireless, cellular and satellite.  TWA Flight 800
could well have fallen victim to an advanced Aegis Electronic Counter Measures
experiment. 

Functioning within many networks are sniffer code mechanisms that affect security and
operations.   The Morris worm proved this point.  Nuisance viruses such as the two
hundred seventy eight WORD macro virus variations are tips of a childish mischief.
Sobczak determined corrupting codes need not be written as virus. 

Sobczak determined that one cannot performance test for embedded code sets triggered
by combinations of unique conditions.  Potentially dangerous code sets are reused thanks
to Federal Cost cutting (Code Reuse)  Sobczak researched mechanisms to identify
corrupted code set reuse.

In 1990, Sobczak demonstrated to Dr. Albanese (USAF/SAM/RSD) the ease with which
embedded code controlling a VDT snap back (screen refresh) could be overwritten to
manipulate the refresh rate.  Code modification above 268 cycles causes ocular muscle
dysfunction.  Future research lead to Sobczak's COTS successes.

1.   Capture and modification of the refresh rate (snap back mechanism) of a video tube.

2.   Disorientation of people using:
          a.   Light
          b.   Sound

3.   Stimulating vibrations in a metal tooth filling
          a.   Pain
          b.   The voice of God

4.   Triggering involuntary nerve synapse

Sobczak told the CIA about the appearance and interest, by several former Soviet
Republics, Russia, China, Columbia and Israel, in US network and BBS source lists. We
located extensive research in psychological operations originating in Russia affecting
equipment operators. Sobczak identified specific areas of interest and tracked
occurrences. By judicious trading we obtained direct dial telephone numbers of Medical
School and Government data repositories.

Officers from USAF Phillips Laboratory at Kirkland AFB visited when my small scale PC
experiments paralleled their large scale EMP program. 

Using a modified television receiver, Sobczak learned to copy VDU screens from machines
as far away as a mile to video tape or to another computer screen.  Wave guides were
required to focus collecting antenna.  Sobczak copied letters of credit from Japanese
Banks received at the Port Authority Teleport (Richmond County, NY), word processing
emissions at UN Headquarters (NYC) and dozens of meaningless home PC screens
located in my test area.

Positive uses of corrupt code sets are endless.  Anything from a dish antenna driver
through a radar guidance system can  be manipulated or destroyed by corrupt code.
Sobczak developed the concept of VIRUS AS A WEAPON (VAAW).  We were interested
in how coded corruption could be used as a countermeasure.

Our next experiment was born out of a BBS report of a mid-west hacker who studies
microwave.  He took control of a transmission tower. ATT validated his claim.  The
potential for aggression was enormous.

Sobczak purchased a BEARCAT 16 scanner. We next obtained an AC/DC converter for
use in an auto cigarette lighter. Radio Shack offers a wide variety of potentially corruptive
signal processors available at low cost.  We obtained aircraft frequencies from the FAA
at John F. Kennedy airport. We were provided a dozen voice and data frequencies. Later
we found a book by Howard Sam's that identified voice frequencies   The rest carried data.

Sobczak separated transmissions from receptions.  Sobczak made no overt attempt to
corrupt.. The plans for a microwave transmitter and needed wave guides to narrow signal
were available from electronics magazines and on anarchist BBS.  Sobczak randomly
transmitted RF signals toward incoming aircraft.  The New York Times reported that
collision warning lights were triggered.  We told the FAA about our experiments.  The FAA
denied our involvement.  We successfully duplicated this experiment with six repetitions
in as many days.
  
Sobczak graded the devices mentioned in our collected data.  Prominent was the A/D
converter subsystem.  We wondered how easily one might corrupt an A/D converter. A call
to the library at the USAF Wright Aeronautical Laboratory, Ohio allowed Sobczak to obtain
DOD/NASA reports defining A/D uses in current weapon systems.

We chose to study Teledyne.  Sobczak wrote code and paper tested a "pause/open/push"
sequence in repetitive mode. The technical manual explained anyone can easily acquire
an access point into the data stack. Code can be entered and directed to a processing
stack without affecting in-use data collecting memories. A transmitter can be constructed
that mixes analog signal being returned from a contact to produce a modified signal.   It
is possible to disrupt a system using the A/D Converter.  Sobczak wrote code to average
input signals. This program nulls the video feed converted data to make the result equal.

Sobczak research determined sensors are not protected.  Corrupt codes can be used to
produce a psychological effect.  The psyops code Sobczak developed is an extension of
his A/D converter research that allows damage to people.

Sobczak determined it feasible to affect brain cells by software produced low frequency
waves. His goal was to alter psychological states (mood changes) and possibly to transmit
stimuli that trigger suggestions and/or commands directly into the human brain. Defense
and the CIA had become paranoid about loss of mind manipulation leadership.  MKULTRA
(ARTICHOKE), MKDELTA, MKNAOMI, MKRESEARCH, BLUEBIRD (renamed
ARTICHOKE by DCI) and a continuation of the earlier CHATTER Project (1947) were
authorized to regain leadership..  Sobczak gained access to these projects.

Research proved that electromagnetic fields raising body temperature by less than 1
degree Celsius result in somatic change.  Chemical, physiological and behavioral changes
occur within "windows" of frequency and energy continua.  One window is at the level of
the human electroencephalogram, i.e., in the range of extremely low radio and sound
waves (+/- 20hertz).

Early paper simulations used energy amplification in the order of magnitude of twelve. This
level was not feasible in current technology.

A soliton wave propagates suddenly acquired energy, or energy imparted by a shock,
without dispersing it. Sobczak's initial research found that soliton waves began being
considered relevant in high energy physics and  in the fusion program in 1985.  Sobczak
began writing software to simulate the soliton wave form in 1991.as a substitute to energy
amplification.

Solitons occur as electro-solitons and as acoustic solitons. They form only at certain
windows. Solitons are dynamically stable "spikes". Solitons have long lifetimes. Their
vibration has a long persistence. The foregoing characteristics contribute to the formation
of soliton energy without a twelve order of magnitude increase predicted by the original
linear assumption.  Software solitons are non-linear.

Solitons allow extracellular disturbances such as acoustic or electromagnetic bursts to be
propagated across a cell membrane.  As a form of corruption or as a anti-corruption tool
one must visualize the human brain and its environment as structures of waves. The
software creates pseudo soliton shock waves. Modern electronics was programmed to
create a range of resonances utilizing the flexibility, speed and accuracy inherent in the
circuitry of a computing device and certain of its peripheral components.

Sobczak attempted to define the frequencies appropriate to repel aggression as well as
the available options for transmission both to the target and across the membrane of brain
cells.  Sobczak's research suggests brain cells will be reachable diversely, flexibly and
routinely in the not too distant future?  Sobczak showed Dr. Albanese at SAM/RSD a
means to use software solitons to affect people. 

Sobczak located Dr. Albanese during research concerning the effects of radiation
generated by over-the-horizon radar on the general populus.  Sobczak used a VAX cluster
at SAM that was at risk to hackers to gain attention.

Exploration of the relationship of computing devices to cross-membrane phenomenon is
not documented anywhere in unclassified publications.  Using software corruption
protection provides a high risk nut enormous payback potential to secure systems from
aggression that subverts the ability of the operator to function. A new phenomenon has
been discovered. Sobczak determined how a computer based soliton can be created in
software and triggered to produce negative effects on people.

Sobczak research determined Russian mathematicians have been concerned with solitons
(initially referred to as excitons) long before Americans became interested. If a literature
search is an acceptable means of determining interest, Americans are still disinterested.
It is conceivable that researchers Davydov, Drazin and Boris Ponomarev functioning under
the wing of Uri Andropov achieved workable results that warranted further testing.

Russian, American, and German scientists successfully entered a membrane
independently.  Sobczak research proved that when the time comes for a fundamental
innovation, discovery or invention to occur, it will occur in several different places at
different times involving independent researchers who do not know of the other's efforts
due to political or military security considerations.

Student hackers from the University of Dayton tried to infect the operational software suite
of SOCOM's MC-130H to revenge perceived slights given by SO/LIC Pathfinders.  These
hackers unknowingly made practical use of software soliton theory. 

Ocular muscles strained in an attempt to adjust to refresh code modifications.  The hackers
attacked the MC-130H System Program Office through the data center in Area B at Wright
Patterson AFB.   Sobczak experiments used overlays of VDT refresh code to misuse the
Video Display system.  The effect produced by an adjusted refresh rate connected through
a network to the outside world is unique.  Sobczak called this software system "Active
Response". It deters aggression.  In test, the Active Response code stopped 99.9% of the
intrusions visited on systems and applications software by hackers.  Active Response
properly placed in a computing system causes a hackers' worse headache.

In 1991 Sobczak showed AIR-055 (Vice Admiral Dunleavy, Admiral of the Lower Half
Hickey and Captain John Paul Jones) how a FLTSATCOM link could be used to port UNIX
"do loops" to Harris hardened but poorly secured VAXES on an operational aircraft carrier.
The Navy leased SATCOM channels from private operators.  Sobczak crossed channels
to capture a Navy leased link.

The Vice Admiral recommended my research to the Chief of Naval Research.  A female
Commander suggested my research was criminal.  The US Navy would arrest and
prosecute me if I continued to find and expand upon my experimental technology.
Sobczak  research continues.  Navy satellites remain at risk.  The UNIX system on capital
ships has yet to be secured.  UNIX has many security features that users fail to implement.
Hackers migrate UNIX networks without fear. .

Sobczak research located corruption at the mini computer level of operation.   Federal
VAXes are the easiest devices to target.  DEC security if effective if it is installed properly
and kept current per DEC Instructions.  Sobczak knows of an inquisitive Federal employee
who has written code to determine if security is properly installed.  If installation is
incomplete the program downloads "/passwd/id/ao" to the interrogator. 

DEC does not protect against resource manipulation. A simple shell will lockup DEC
equipment.  Sobczak showed this weakness to V.ADM. Dunleavy at AIR-055 at the
Pentagon.  While Sobczak cannot verify the statistic, it was suggested that ego causes
failure to admit error 8 of 10 times.

Sobczak called the central exchange of a military facility involved in weapon systems
development to gain access.  He asked for the telephone number of the computer center.
This was easily obtained.  At the data center we told the secretary answering our call that
we needed the direct dial number of the computer room so we might talk to our SE.  In 10
of 10 tries the computer room telephone number was given automatically without thought
as to the consequences of the act.  As no one ever calls the computer room except with
problems so the request for a clean line for a system error log upload produced current
telephone numbers 8 of 10 times.

The two hundred fifty odd passwords of Mr. Morris Jr are effective adjuncts to password
hackers(code breaking software) like Deluxe Hack or FH.

HP's older TI990's, than in use, are the easiest targets.  Security of the HP 990 in the F-16
SPO at WPAFB is nonexistent.  The targeted machine manages life cycle budget
projections.  Intelligence gathering mixed with common sense allows a multitude of data
to be identified.  The SPO machine was linked the higher commands, Logistics Centers
and Contractor computers..

Sobczak researched protection of the UNIX/Xenix kernel. We believe that a job queue
monitor is a practical answer to security without loss of processing speed. Files and
programs would be validated and verified prior to execution.

Sobczak has arrangements with individuals we consider expert in the ability to convert
code from language A to language B within and among OS. We have found that these
experts take corrupted code we obtain and/or generate and convert it to minicomputer and
mainframe code in hours. As Sobczak gains experience we find that we can take a
program through disassembly, execution of the appropriate diagnostics, adjustment of the
disassembled code to optimize function, and, reassemble in a mini or mainframe format
in less than one hour.
                                                 
The Sobczak team for anti-corruption research includes hardware specialists.   At the VAX
level a corrupt code can  placed on an machine in  a manner that defies human detection.
Further, the VIRUS destroys itself on execution leaving no trace of prior existence.  DEC
hardware specialists have replaced components and filed quality failure reports concerning
damage that was virus initiated using a PC programmed REXX shell programmed by
Sobczak.

In 1993 I told the NSA that DOD had a problem.  Rumor in the ether said that the Director
of DARPA (Gary Denman) had brought his girl friend from his last post to Washington.
She worked for a large corporation that received an abnormal amount of research awards.
At the time of our research the buzz word for funding at DARPA was MCM (Multi-chip
Module).  At a meeting in the Pentagon cafeteria protagonists who wanted to blackmail
DARPA were almost identified.  AF Special Investigations using Pentagon Police raided
the cafeteria. 

As in most things military, snafu ruled.  The Pentagon Police arrested some minor
uninvolved hackers (the wrong criminals) who happened to be having a 2600-type
meeting.

The hackers were released with apologies and the attempt to suborn the DARPA Head
continued until someone leaked the story to the Washington Post.  The big corporation
continues to receive an inordinate amount of research awards.  Sobczak followed
electronic exchanges and harvested dozens of new information sources at major
contractor facilities.

During 1994 and 1995 Sobczak concentrated his research into intelligence and technology
collection skewed to corrupting code sets that might be modified into security tools.
Available intelligence about weapons research is everywhere.  Sobczak told the Naval
Investigative Service about applications software that produced logistics models for the
F-14 and F-18.  Working systems with nomenclature and parts lists were available on
Foreign  Bulletin Board Systems.  The NIS at Suitland Parkway in a Washington D.C.
suburb said not to worry.  Contractors sometime transfer information using the INTERNET.

No one cared that the node Sobczak polled was found in then communist Europe
(Warsaw, Poland).. Worse the same source taught me to manipulate the Defense Data
Network.

The SDI was at risk because the SDI Operations Staff did not remove Installation System
Engineers IDs and Passwords.  Good old MGR.SYS opened dozens of HP 3000s to
interrogation.  Further, links from the Pentagon to the National Test Bed Facility, SAIC,
Boeing, etc. were available through computers at Huntsville Arsenal.

During Operation Desert Storm, Sobczak offered an operations officer at SO/L.C. the
opportunity to hack Iraqi C2.  Sobczak had access to a Thompson CSF backbone running
under COSMOS.  Sobczak communicated daily with four individuals in Kuwait.  They
provided insight that I passed to SOLIC.

Sobczak explored intrusion mechanisms created by aggressive personalities.  He
predicted that 184,000 intrusions would occur within DOD.  In 1995 DOD admitted
numbers close to the forecast.  Further, DISA acknowledged that victims had reported
intrusion and data loss only 2% of the time. 

Intrusions occur in any system because intruders are using lawful IDs and Passwords  The
problem grows out of proportion to reality.  Most intrusions go unreported.  Those in
charge hide intrusions from Upper Management to protect their jobs.  Trusted employees
are frequent culprits.   Sobczak created an integrated software security solution (V-
PHAGE) modeled on the NSA compartmentalization model.  The USAF said that properly
installed the V-PHAGE solution is unbeatable. .

Sobczak was able to locate a General Officer (Eagleton?) who as Commander of the F-16
SPO had an ID and Password that he never used.  This became backup access.

In 1995 while visiting a contractor in Arlington's IDA building Sobczak met an engineer
from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).  Weather trapped him in Arlington,
VA for three days in an ice/snow storm.  This engineer was a great source of insight for
security research.  He told Sobczak about the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
Hacker Project.  The US Army was spending millions at that time to find and arrest hackers
who might seek Army secrets.

LLNL and LANL competed for the same security budget lines.  LLNL was funded by USAF
Cryptological Support Center at Kelly AFB, TX .  LANL was funded by the Army
Intelligence Agency.  LLNL leaked information about the LANL Hacker project to the
hacker community.  Hackers went on to mislead LANL computer scientists.  The Army
spent millions to collect garbage.  Dr. (Col) Alexander ignored Sobczak's warnings..

It continued to snow.  We (LLNL Engineer and I) spent most of our time trading stories.
He explained the Sniffer attacks on LLNL before LLNL Management could deny their
occurrence.  About 30,300 DOD computers were interdicted by hackers using sniffers.
Drug dealers from Columbia paid European hackers and trusted government employees
to locate secrets in the DEA and USCG databases.  The American-Jewish hacker
community helped the Israeli government to create a shopping list of secret American
Technologies.  The super secret National Reconn Office was not secret to hackers.
Sobczak identified insecurities and created solutions to negate potential attacks. .

The experience of knowing about things hidden within security classifications is stressful.
While visiting a Manhattan hotel a Russian National approached me.  He gave me a
"CCCP" gold pin.  He said was an Olympic lawyer yet he wanted to purchase my
intelligence and security knowledge.  His sources claimed Sobczak research results were
focused and relevant. 

Sobczak called the FBI.  An FBI Agent was assigned   Some months later while having
dinner in a Queens, NY restaurant two men started a conversation.  They happened to be
officers from a Russian ship docked in Brooklyn, NY.  They invited me to see their new
computers.  I wondered how strangers knew about my involvement with computers.  The
FBI was again involved.  Foreign intelligence appears to equal or exceed that available
to US agencies here at home.  Foreigners, particularly those involved with the UN and
Trade Missions buy American technology for scientists at home to duplicate.

The United States does not have legislation that prohibits signal collection.  SIGINT for the
masses is practiced by hackers.  It can be as simple as listening to CB or SSB channels.
The equipment and tools hackers use are defined somewhere on the Internet.  Knowing
the frequencies and bandwiths used by computer equipment and peripheral devices helps
make some hackers, super spies.

A listening device plugged into a wall in a private office exposes information to the
listening world.  In a few cost conscious companies they purchase and use these devices.
Managers never dream that anyone could use these cost cutting devices against them.
Transceiver placement is very similar to the art form called "Bugging."  DEA wires drug
buyers.  They arrest the seller and have tapes of the transaction.  Anyone with a
BEARCAT scanner can listen to the .5 watt transmissions if they are in range and find the
right frequency.

Computer weapons beyond those that target Information warfare flood the net.  Sobczak
located twenty-five electronic weapons with schematics, narrative plans, parts lists and test
plans.  The potential for multiple hits in a universe of one hundred million users is great.
Ten years ago I gave the USAF code that created enough friction (heat) to fry a BIOS chip.
.
RESUMES 

     Owner::   Thomas V.  Sobczak -- BA, Social Science, St. Johns U., Brooklyn,
NY; MBA, Management, Hofstra U., Hempstead, NY; Ph.D., Management, Sussex College,
England; Visiting Professor & lecturer: Fellow - Society of Manufacturing  Engineers:
Fellow - Institute for the Advancement of Engineering (IAE): Fellow Institution of
Production Engineer (England); Certified Manufacturing Engineer (SME); Licensed
Professional Engineer; Author (6 books, 700 articles); Counselor and Advisorto Industry
and Government; Appointee: NATO CSA and DOC  NDER.

Thomas V. Sobczak, Consultants employs consultants with specific skills concerning
creating non-traditional code based responses to manipulate computer equipment and
software systems.

7. FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
 
BALDWIN, NEW YORK

Sobczak's work setting consists of professional offices, storage areas, and a computer
laboratory for experiments.

In Baldwin ACC has functioning:
     1 80486 compatible device w/80 GB       1 Multi-frequency scanner 
     3 80386  compatible device w/1.2 GB          1 Natl Panasonic receiver
     1 Compaq Armada Laptop w/10 GB          Misc Wave Guides
     1 Zenith Z148 device w/120MB                      1 Tandy Realistic receiver
     1 Epson Geneva w/80MB Tape                   1 Apple IIe
     1 6803 A/D converter                              1 8702 A/D converter
     1 Accusort scanner sensing system                

PROPOSAL:

Sobczak proposes to work in phases geared to the needs of the United States
Government.   

Phase One - Develop Database

Sobczak proposes to survey the INTERNET, FTP, TELENET and BBS universe worldwide
to define the COTS equipments relevant to injection of radio frequency or microwave
signal into Defense weapon system computing equipment.

Sobczak using his software search engine (SIID) will produce a database of suspect
equipments and software.

Phase Two -  Designing Counter Force

Sobczak will define available data that exploits vulnerabilities of equipment identified
during Phase One.  We will analyze and structure the information to relate threats.
Sobczak will produce a plan to develop a proof-of-concept for demonstration purposes.

Sobczak will provide an analysis of risk by equipment, citing the vulnerability causing  risk
to equipments and software.  We will suggest appropriate countermeasures to neutralize
identified vulnerabilities.

Phase Three - Development of Injection Equipments

Verify and validate specific attack mechanisms that corrupt electronics by substituting or
manipulating computer code in a processing device